Conference on the full integration of Israel in the EU
European Parliament, Brussels, 4-6 March 2002

Israel: A Return to Europe?

Submission by Professor Raymond Cohen
Department of International Relations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Introduction: Intertwined Cultures

Mr/Madam chairperson, honourable members of the European Parliament, colleagues: I am grateful for the opportunity to address you on this issue. My perspective is that of an Israeli academic speaking about Israel's needs and hopes. I certainly do not presume to tell you what is in Europe's interest. On a personal note I must right away admit that the concept of Israeli membership of the European Union projects some creative thinking into what is an otherwise bleak discussion of Israel's future. At present, Israelis are locked into a conventional nationalist and strategic mindset more suited to the nineteenth than to the twenty-first century.

The proposal for Israel's admission to full membership of the European Union is an intriguing idea that could provide a new long-term vision for Israelis and help to reframe the dispute over the advantages and disadvantages of a peace settlement. It is not a panacea or a substitute for a root-and-branch resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, the prospect of Israel's entry into Europe could encourage moderate forces, rejuvenate public discourse, break the near-monopoly of chauvinist ideas, and provide a set of incentives for creative thinking in the peace process.

My starting point is a profound conviction that the vision of a European Israel is profoundly in the spirit of Jewish history. It is grounded in fact, not fiction. The two main branches of Jewry, the Ashkenazi (German) and Sephardi (Spanish) Jews, are an integral part of the European family, speaking until a generation ago European languages, Yiddish and Ladino. The contribution of great European Jews such as Spinoza, Freud, Kafka and many others to European civilization is well known. Arriving in Europe in large numbers after Judea's two defeats at the hands of Rome in 70 and 135 AD, Jews are as native to Europe as any European national group that arrived earlier or later. But for the Nazi exterminations the great European Jewish centres, from Berlin to Rome, Budapest to Warsaw, Thessalonika to Sarajevo, would still be thriving centres of Jewish life. They were eliminated by no choice of the Jews. That the remnants of European Jewry opted for life in Israel remote from the death camps, a place where they could start a new life and defend themselves, was natural. But this hardly severs historical Jewish ties to Europe. The European experience is as much a defining feature of Jewish culture as the converse.

Traditional Zionism's loss of direction
First, let me suggest a diagnosis of Israel's malaise. Since the June 1967 War, mainstream Zionism, in the shape of the Israel Labour Party founded by David Ben-Gurion, has been largely eclipsed. Traditionally, Zionism saw itself as the national liberation movement of the Jewish people and took pride in a philosophy of social justice and political pragmatism. It never cast Israel in the role of the enemy of other national liberation movements but accepted the cardinal principle of partition-a two-state solution-as the key to a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

After the disastrous Yom Kippur War of 1973 the Labour Party was brought down by popular dissatisfaction with its social record and perceived elitist alienation from popular opinion. The 1967-77 decade was also marked by creative paralysis and a failure to translate military success into political achievement. The vacuum created by Labour's fall was filled by the Revisionist movement, presenting its ultra-nationalist notions in populist, anti-establishment terms. The Revisionist Herut Party, hitherto marginal, then transformed itself into the fulcrum of most subsequent governments. Prime Ministers Begin, Shamir, Netanyahu and Sharon all reflected in their way the worldview of Revisionist Zionism. This is a nationalist ideology with an oddly archaic set of beliefs in national destiny, settlement of the historical land of Israel, and interminable struggle. In its populist version it is stridently militaristic and chauvinist.

Today the agenda of Israel politics is almost completely dominated by Revisionist ideas reinforced by fundamentalist and mystical religious themes. Fearful stereotypes from the Diaspora have also resurfaced. Settlers in the occupied territories are viewed as the heroic heirs of the Zionist pioneers. Occupation and settlement are presented as expressions of a sacrosanct historical right and essential to Israel's survival. The Palestinians are anathematized as a reincarnation of Amalek, the quintessential enemy of the Jewish people from time immemorial. Critical external agencies, such as the European Union, are viewed with suspicion as a modern version of the Poritz, the Jews' East European overlord and oppressor.

In the face of populist, xenophobic Revisionist slogans, traditional Zionism has failed to present a convincing alternative worldview. The striking message of peace and reconciliation presented by Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn in September 1993 provided a mobilizing ideal that promised to recapture public opinion from the ultra-nationalists. A generation of young people, the 'candle children' who later mourned his murder, was truly inspired by it. But the failure of negotiations at Camp David in July 2000 and the proliferation of violence expunged Rabin's vision as a viable political factor.

Now, the peace movement in Israel is in disarray and has difficulty in finding an audience for its message of reconciliation between Jews and Arabs. Many ordinary Israelis blame the architects of the Oslo process for the present predicament. Shimon Peres's vision of a 'new Middle East' is widely scorned. Politically, the return of the Labour Party to power in the foreseeable future appears unlikely. Ariel Sharon, envisaging only protracted conflict, enjoys broad support precisely because his pessimistic and martial policies reflect the widespread disenchantment with 'dangerous illusions of peace'. Political arrangements, to the extent that they are discussed at all any more, are framed in terms of narrow calculations about the gains and losses for Israel's security. Security, indeed, is cast solely in military terms.

A vision of Israel in the European Union
It is here that the European vision fits in. The prospect of Israel's admission to the European Union presents an opportunity to break the mould and recast the terms of the current debate. Today Israeli public opinion tends to regard a peace settlement from one point of view only: as a loss of sacred land and sacrifice of defensive depth. In return the best that can be hoped for is a political arrangement of uncertain worth. The conflict with the Palestinians might conceivably be managed more successfully and perhaps reduced in intensity. On the whole, though, any agreement with the Palestinians is regarded as an irresponsible capitulation to terrorism and a diminution of momentous proportions, a withdrawal, in Abba Eban's words, 'to Auschwitz borders'.

If Israel could look forward to a future within the European Union then a historical compromise with the Palestinian people could be seen in perspective as a great opportunity rather than a loss in a zero sum game. This does not mean that judicious security arrangements should not be an essential feature of a peace settlement. Rather, that the promise of Israel's inclusion in the European Union would transform a disheartening anticipation of national contraction and vulnerability into a more confident prospect of incorporation into a wider community of nations. Psychology is everything in a nation's self-image and identity. Redefined as an extension of European space, Israel's size is no more relevant than that of Belgium or Holland.

A prospect of inclusion in Europe would also present itself as a compelling message to rival the cramped chauvinism of Revisionist Zionism. True believers in a restoration of the ancient homeland are unlikely to be convinced. But these are a minority among supporters of the Likud and its satellite parties. In the absence to date of an elevating alternative they have been allowed for too long to dominate the debate about the direction of contemporary Zionism. If there is a crisis of civil and human rights in Israel now it is because Revisionist Zionism has nothing to say on universal themes. The European idea could provide a unifying, humanistic vision and rallying cry to the splintered majority who are not mystically wedded to Judea and Samaria. Ultimately, as much as it is about safety from danger, the argument over Israel's hold over the territories is about identity and ideology. By restoring to Israelis the European dimension of their identity it would make it easier for the silent majority to relinquish the unattainable myth of a restoration of Biblical Israel.

In reaction to the proposition of a European role Israelis are likely to voice serious objections. They will protest that there can be no return to a European identity after the Holocaust, that hypothetical European security guarantees are no substitute for an American alliance, and that admission into the European Union would vindicate those who say that Israel is a foreign body in the Middle East. The rejoinder to all this must be that joining Europe does not preclude American guarantees and appropriate defensive arrangements, that contemporary Europe asks for no exclusive pledges of allegiance and that it is not an entity in the old-fashioned nation-state tradition. Moreover, an Israel trapped in eternal conflict with the Palestinians is hardly a viable long-term partner for the United States, let alone neighbouring Arab countries. As part of the European Union Israel would be able to shape its multifaceted identity and culture free from the crushing burdens of interminable historical grievances and obsessions. It might also be able to revive the Jews' historical vocation, so beneficial during the golden age of Moslem Spain, of cultural intermediary between Islam and the West.