Europe is proud of its soft power. A pride which, to a great extent, is justified by the return within the European family of people separated for half a century by an iron curtain, by the worthy humanitarian aid provided by the European Union in many critical points all over the planet, and by the determination in promoting multilateral cooperation as a means for conflict resolution. However, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) launched in 1999, forty five years after the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC), acknowledged that change had occurred in the strategic scene globally and, consequently, that the Union needed to assume its responsibility for participating in the management of crises and the prevention of conflicts outside its own borders.

Ten years later we are still far from achieving ESDP's main objective, that is providing Europe with an autonomous capacity in projecting itself worldwide. The underlying problems, as the history of European construction shows, have a political nature. And the current financial crisis only worsens the picture. All over the world, even on the other side of the Atlantic, military budgets fall victim to the axe of national paymasters, all very busy recovering resources to face the crisis. Furthermore, in Europe, the unsustainable growth of expenditures to address completely irrelevant strategic objectives is an evident problem. Does it make sense to maintain armaments that are basically deployed for territorial defence and to face conventional threats emerging from the continent's Eastern border, in other words from Russia or even from strategic EU partners or even NATO's? Do we still need tanks and heavy artillery, or rather do we need strategic and tactical air transport, light and multifunctional ground forces for international missions, not to mention more efficient communications?

The answer to these questions is a truism but apparently not for national budgets, not to speak for the political agendas of those in charge of European defence.

The crude facts show that the annual military expenditures of the 27 member states add up to a considerable amount, 201 billion euros. Of which, about 55% serves to support nearly 2 million men and women in uniform: half a million more than the superpower USA, which spends around 20% of its military budget on personnel. And, unlike the USA that operates with its troops in all the hotspots of the globe, the 70% of the European ground forces are not capable of operating outside their national territory. And yet, the USA spends 29% of the military budget on investments - mainly research and development- while the Europeans dedicate only 19%.

Thus, is it not surprising that the total of the military expenses of the 27 member states, which amounts to one quarter of the global one, produces an efficiency well below that threshold. And the disaggregated data worsens on the national level: apart from some European actors that still enjoy a capacity of global projection (United Kingdom and France), and budgets that are relatively "solid", to support the related effort the situation in the majority of the other countries (Italy and Germany included) reveals a huge inadequacy whether regarding the quantity or the quality of the expenditures.

It is time to reverse, once and for all, this obstinate and pernicious tendency (even for taxpayers) that makes Europe drift towards strategic irrelevance. How to do that? I see three ways to change the course:
- By rationalizing expenses. A large amount of costs could be eliminated, or reduced, by progressively harmonizing, at European level, planning, investments and operational compatibility of military equipments. That was, among other, the ambition of the European Defence Agency, a project which is still systematically and recklessly opposed by the ministries of defence. To say it with Nick Witney, who was the first director of the Agency, and also author of the recent report of the European Council of Foreign Relations Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy, "the chronic shortage of means and of qualified personnel, and the failed modernization of military equipment, means that most of the 200 billions are simply wasted";
- By strengthening the institutions, linked to the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The spasmodic waiting for the last ring in the endless chain of ratifications casts a shadow over the realization that a Union finally equipped with operational, as well as fully recognized, structures acting on the global scene (a high representative for a common foreign and security policy; an integrated diplomatic service; a structured defence cooperation) will eliminate all alibis for not taking up responsibility in maintaining international peace and security;
- By consolidating multilateralism and dialogue. It seems obvious to say so in an epoch where conflicts apparently seem as decentralized as unsolvable, but the key way to reduce military expenses is through nonviolent resolution of conflicts. It is the road advocated by President Obama, including the aspiration to a generalized nuclear disarmament. It is also the road advocated by many European actors, among which I'd like to mention Science for Peace, a movement launched by the Veronesi Foundation. As well as the Transnational Radical Party, whose history and experience was and is based on nonviolence.