The sabotage of the iitiative: “Free Iraq, the only alternative to the war in Iraq”

NEW! The questions never asked to Tony Blair and... Saddam Hussein

Through the silence of the media, playing against the majority of the Italian Parliament, the Government prevented the success of the radical project for the exile of Saddam Hussein.

In January 2003 the Nonviolent Radical Party transnational and transparty (NRP), sought to convince the Italian, European and global public opinion that in respect of Iraq, and of the Middle East at large, the real and lasting alternative was not “war or peace”. It was “war or freedom, rights, democracy and therefore peace”. A two-part appeal was thus launched to the international community, to the United Nations (UN) and to the Italian parliament demanding that they endorse the statements in favour of the exile of the dictator Saddam Hussein. Such an option would have cancelled the necessity of the war and would have provided the starting point for a political solution to the Iraqi standoff.
The second part of the radical project was the set-up of a temporary international Trustee Administration, by bestowing a high level statesman the power to create within two years, the necessary conditions for the Iraqis to enjoying their rights and freedom as indicated in the UN Charter. In a couple of months, the appeal Free Iraq was signed by 26.506 citizens from 171 countries, including 46 MEPs and 501 MPs of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, which corresponded to 53.5% of all Italian MPs1.

On 8 February 2003, President Berlusconi sends a long and complex message to Gaddafi, in which several possible agreements with Saddam Hussein were mentioned. These supposed deals implied Saddam to step down and the transfer into exile of Saddam and his entourage in all security and with the guarantee. The details had to be discussed yet2. A few days later Berlusconi tells Bush that Gaddafi’s answer is affirmative.

On 19 February 2003, the Italian Parliament voted the proposal put forward by the Radical members for an exile for Saddam and his entourage, with a guarantee for immunity (but not impunity). The proposal, which enjoyed the support of the Government, received 345 votes in favour, 38 against and 52 abstentions. It committed the Berlusconi Government to “promote within all main international bodies, especially the UN Security Council, the option to send the Iraqi dictator in exile and to provide for a temporary UN-led government to restore the fundamental rights of the Iraqi people3”. During the debate, President Berlusconi asserted that the Italian government “is doing this confidentially – as a case like this requires – not only with an Arab country who offered to be mediator, but with more countries and constantly in touch with the US administration and the President of the European Union Kostas Simitis4”.

As agreed with Bush, in the following days Berlusconi will be informed by Gaddafi that Saddam is open to go into exile and ready to discuss the details.

On 22 February 2003 Bush received in his ranch in Crawford, Texas, the Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar. That was a key moment in understanding what was happening and what would happen. Blair and Berlusconi participated in the meeting through a conference call. Ambassador Javier Rupérez declassified the minutes of the meeting for the Spanish government. The minutes (later published in El Paìs on 26 September 2007) show how Bush thought it necessary and urgent to move towards war in Iraq. They also show that Aznar suggests extreme prudence to Bush. The US President tells then what Berlusconi had communicated to him earlier, notably the positive answer of Saddam over the proposal for exile, obtained through the mediation of colonel Gaddafi. Bush remains nevertheless rigid in refusing any agreement whatsoever with the dictator; he judges the condition of Saddam as desperate and says that “he could be killed within two months”. He adds that Saddam - labeled as “a thief, terrorist, war criminal, and compared with Saddam, Milosevic would have been a Mother Theresa” - asked for “one billion dollars” and “all information he wanted on weapons of mass destructions”. At this point, Blair implores that the start of hostilities be delayed by a few days with respect to the date of March 10th. Bush is inflexible: he wants war.

These minutes, never proven false, clearly show the positions of the actors involved. Saddam is not unyielding. He is ready to go.

The NRP campaign continues and on 23 February 2003 Mr Pannella warns the Italian Government, the EU and Mr Blair against trusting Gaddafi as a mediator. The Crawford meeting is only 24 hours away.

The unreliability of the Libyan leader is confirmed on 1 March 2003, at a summit of the Arab League in Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt. The Arab leaders gathered to formally discuss the exile of Saddam Hussein. According to several witnesses, including Emma Bonino, Gaddafi succeeded in obstructing the Arab League from discussing the proposal for the exile for Saddam, put forward by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan. Officials sent by the president of the United Arab Emirates Zayed al-Nahyan had a meeting with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad for four times. The Emir himself was about to announce that the Iraqi dictator was ready to accept the exile. He was simply asking to officially receive the proposal from the League of Arab States and “not from the Americans”.

In a public statement after the conclusions of the meeting, the UAE Information says that the initiative undertaken by his country for a pacific regime-change in Iraq was also supported by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: “At the end of the meeting we also received support from other countries, but unfortunately these countries refuse to confront the problem in discussion tables. All Arab states agreed that Saddam should give up his power, but no one had the courage to say it in public”.

On 6 March 2003 official Arab sources report that the “Foreign Affairs Ministers of Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia and Syria will be on mission to Baghdad asking Saddam to leave the country and avoid war”. At the same time, during the UN General Assembly, the Ambassador of Pakistan Munir Akram says that Saddam links his acceptance to exile with a guarantee for immunity against war crimes committed.

Interestingly, “immunity, not impunity” is the repetitive call by Mr Pannella during the campaign. Only now he is allowed to present his proposal in the national news.

We are on the eve of the war. On 18 March 2003 Bush poses an ultimatum: Saddam and his entourage have 48 hours to leave the country. In fact he constrained Saddam to be exposed to the situation described on 22 February in Crawford. Saddam had no guarantee that his life will be saved.

On 19 March 2003, the public opinion, in the USA and elsewhere, learned about the results of a survey conducted on 25 January 2003 kept secret until then: the majority of Americans (62%) are in favor of an exile for Saddam, on the condition that he left power and that war be avoided.

On 21 March 2003, Mr Pannella spent the whole night speaking begging the Italian ambassador to meet with President Hosni Mubarak “also in the week-end”. One Sunday later we learnt that British Ambassador was meant to see President Mubarak, but it was too late.

The Italian government, strengthened by the Resolution adopted in February, had to promote the exile option in all international bodies. This would have permitted to gather a large consensus among different countries and institutions. Nevertheless, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council, which met twice in the months before the invasion (on 24/02/2003 e il 18/03/2003) was never involved by the Italian representatives.

Is it true that there was an alternative to the war and at the same time the possibility of liberating Iraq from Saddam? Why was it not pursued? Is Mr Pannella right when he talked about sabotage? Why this sabotage? These are questions that need to be answered.