All-Russian Public Movement
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PRESSING CIVIL RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN TODAY’S RUSSIA
Memorandum on the Current Situation

Developments unfolding in the current Russian society have been causing a good deal of concern on the part of local human rights organisations. We regard V. Putin’s policy course as a purposeful effort to curtail the declared civil and political rights and do away with the democratic institutions still active in the Russian Federation.

Starting from January 1, 2000, and all the way through October 25, 2003, when the noted Russian entrepreneur Mikhail Khodorkovsky was taken into custody, the Putin regime had been seen evolving from the “directed democracy” (maintained to take the best advantage of democratic institutions established in the previous decade in the Russian Federation) to the authoritarian regime whose many dimensions are clearly reminiscent of repressive policies pursued by the old Russian autocracy nearly a century ago.

Once again, for the first time over the past sixteen years, Russia has seen political prisoners emerge as a category. Just to remind, Russian voters have been through the December 7, 2003 parliamentary and the March 14, 2004 presidential elections. To emphasise, the campaign and vote tally efforts for the State Duma elections had been characterised by unprecedented abuse of authority when it came to employing the monopoly control over the mass media, the circumstance being underscored by the relevant OSCE monitoring report. Given an independent scrutiny of 60 thousand (out of the 92 thousand available) election commission-origin vote protocols, one had sufficient grounds to conclude that as many as 3.5 million ballots cast (equivalent to 5-6% of the vote) had been fraudulent, which obviously offers a totally different picture of the country’s public policy scene, with liberal parties being effectively barred from the newly formed parliament and the “pro-government party” thereby receiving a qualified majority in the State Duma. Notably, similar claims can be attributed to the March 2004 presidential elections that had nothing short of a plebiscite in support of the incumbent President Putin. To point out, members of the left-wing and liberal opposition forces had been practically devoid of any opportunity to appeal to their supporters, while local authorities had been most heavily engaged in poorly camouflaged subornation of the electorate. Given the scene, many democratic politicians and human rights activists called for boycotting the elections, while passing those as a cynical sham.

Under those conditions, some of the leading Russian public figures and mass media personalities joined their forces to set up the 2008 Committee, the purpose being to assure prosecution of democratic presidential elections in 2008 following the incumbent President Putin leaving the political scene as stipulated by the current Constitution of the Russian Federation. Notably, as she left the “Union of Right Forces” (SPS) that eventually turned to be pro-presidential, Irina Khakamada has chosen to build up her own opposition party of left-wing liberals.

Coming up as a totally new type of criminal prosecution has been the application of Article 228 (Fostering Ethnic and Religious Enmity) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. By way of example, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office concocted a case of A. Sakharov Museum. It so happened that in late December 2003, a prosecutor from the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office filed suit against Yuri Samodurov, the Museum’s curator and distinguished human rights activist, art critic Lyudmila Vasilovskaya and three painters that ran an exhibition (“Beware: Religion!”) held by the Museum at that time. The investigators passed the effort as “an organised crime gang with relevant roles being assigned”. To underscore, the very same statute was applied to bring action on the fact of a fiction story fragment being gleaned from the Internet and reproduced by Radical Politics bulletin.

Generally, in the past four years Russia has seen the basic principles of constitutional democracy being either discarded or hollowed out. To point out, the effort to that end has been done through the use of a broad range of legal, quasi-legal and even illegitimate and forcible tactics.

1. War in Chechnya and anti-terrorist litigations

1.1. Developments in Chechnya

Making the most crucial event in the last few years in Russia has been the ongoing international (domestic) conflict in Chechnya characterised by massive and crude human rights violations primarily perpetrated by members of the federal coercive agencies. For the most part, those acts continue to include massive and unjustified applications of force in local communities formed by peaceful residents, mopping-up operations and arbitrary executions (accompanied by numerous marauding acts, tortures and beatings, the relevant evidence being available in abundance), death-squad raids undertaken either by members of Russian special services or elements from the local militia formations providing security for the pro-Kremlin Kadyrov government currently ruling Chechnya. To emphasise, the extent of humanitarian law violations has been heavily in excess of the comparable level applicable to the first Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 when Russians had been much better informed about the military effort there, with most of the domestic politicians sharply attacking the ongoing war in Chechnya. The next-in-scale violation of human rights in the Chechen conflict has been made by the continued pressures applied to the forced migrants (domestic migrants), with tens of thousands of those still being settled in the neighbouring Republic of Ingushetia. Camps for displaced persons are being torn down by the authorities, while no residential buildings are built under disparate pretexts, with the refugees being continuously deprived of the staple food supplies, heating and electricity. Right now, Russian authorities seek to liquidate refugee camps (temporary accommodation centres for internally displaced persons) in Ingushetia by March 1, 2004.

It was precisely the war in Chechnya that underpinned the government policy aimed to introduce censorship, bolster the role of special services in the public policy realm and shape the intended government propaganda effort. Coming hand in hand with the war effort have been incrementally growing ethnic discrimination and xenophobia.

Chechnya has seen the declared freedom of _expression principles most grossly violated when the President Putin decreed in contravention of the Russian Constitution to run a constitutional referendum (March 2003) and “hold an election to choose the first president of the Chechen Republic” (October 2003). Notably, international and domestic observers noted a tremendous gap between the numbers of those cleared to vote and the election results officially released. The “presidential elections” in Chechnya had been characterised by a focused effort to remove any and all major Khadyrov’s rivals.

All these cases of human rights and basic civil liberties violations, just like calls for resuming the OSCE Mission on Chechnya, have been repeatedly carried by numerous documents released by domestic human rights organisations, including the Moscow Helsinki Group, Memorial Human Rights Centre, For Human Rights movement and other public associations.

1.2. Closed-door litigation on terrorism

Justifying tough measures pursued in Chechnya had been a number of terrorist attacks that certain Russian government bodies chose to directly link with Chechen radicals and terrorists. The first ones in that category had been the September 1999 explosions that killed hundreds of people in Moscow and Volgodonsk-based apartment buildings, just like rather mysterious events in Ryazan when the local police detained some FSB (Federal Security Service) officers planting explosive mockups in the basement of a residential building (the operation later being passed as a training exercise). In contravention of the applicable Federal Law on FSB, the relevant FSB officials would not release the plan for that “exercise”.

The trial of Krymshamkhalov and Dekkushev – persons accused of organising those terrorist attacks – has been completed with numerous procedural abuses committed in the process as the matter was considered by the Moscow City Court. The hearing was held behind closed doors, which runs counter to the applicable legislation, to say nothing of the fact that the aggrieved parties had not been asked to attend. To underscore, a good number of substance-related facts had been disregarded by the judges, one of those being that the Volgodonsk explosion was a subterranean explosion, while according to the case materials a truck of explosive materials detonated close to the residential building in question. Also, the judges appeared to have ignored a number of most relevant facts related to the Moscow explosion (with the allegedly exploded basement holding the explosives remaining intact and one material witness (lessor of the pertinent storage facility) indicating that he had been forced by FSB officers to change his testimony when identifying the person that had leased the given storage facility, and identify Gochiyaev put on the “wanted” list.

Despite the fact that the defendants had prepared the explosive compounds for the Volgodonsk terrorist attack, they also had been tried as accomplices in the Moscow explosions. Following the arrest of M. Trepashkin (attorney for the victims), who made a statement on the FSB evidence being fraudulent, his substitute had not been allowed by the court to study the case-related materials.

To remind, the late October of 2002 saw tragic events at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow when the authorities all of a sudden chose to take the theatre building by assault, notwithstanding the declared breakthrough in negotiations with the Chechen hostage-takers. The assaulting troops used some incapacitating gas (the fact being recently admitted by FSB) based on trimethylfentanil – a powerful synthetic chemical substance. The operation left 125 hostages dead, with hundreds of others sustaining bad injuries and serious health disorders. The assaulting troops shot dead close to 40 sleeping Chechen women that had participated in the hostage-taking operation. What is more, the forensic experts had badly distorted the autopsy evidence to avoid having to indicate the “narcotic substance” as the cause of lethal outcome in many of the cases. Importantly, Irina Khakamada, the presidential contender (that participated in negotiations with the terrorists) publicly declared that there was no threat to the life of hostages that would have justified storming the theatre building with the use of incapacitating gas. Both I. Khakamada and Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov (deputy head of the commanding authority set up to release the hostages) actually confirmed that underpinning the assault (that killed every fifth hostage) had exclusively been political considerations (no compromises with terrorists could be tolerated).

While rejecting the demands of human rights activists, the domestic prosecutors and other law enforcers have strongly resisted any move to file suit against pertinent government officials for committing criminal offences in the course of the given assault operation.

Examples of by-the-book (though running counter to the spirit of democracy and federalism featured by the Russian Constitution) actions in the implementation of the aforesaid policy course have been made by the following crucial measures passed by the Putin regime.

2. Terminating the system of federalism

Following reshaping of the Federation Council, the upper house (formerly made up by elected heads of regional legislatures and executives) is now formed by relevant appointees from amongst civil servants or businessmen. To add, the President ruled to have the entire Russian territory carved up into seven administrative districts, all headed by his appointees, the latter for the most part being retired high-ranking FSB officers. Recent shifts in the tax legislation have resulted in a significant drop of the regions’ share of collected revenues, with most of the provinces being nearly totally dependent for their livelihood on the central government as a consequence. Following the passage of all these measures largely supported by the lower chamber of Parliament, Russia has been put back a decade when running the country was a unified central government.

3. Phasing out the freedom of speech. Limiting civil and political liberties

Other technically “legal” moves have been the newly passed amendments to the legislation on political parties, elections and mass media. Now, all political and journalistic activities have been increasingly governed by the state, regulated and manipulated by arbitrary government officials. As a matter of fact, the authorities have been cleared to scrutinise the Internet traffic, accept and consider anonymous applications and messages dispatched to the law enforcement agencies, run lie-detector tests on the suspects.

Wherever these measures are not enough, provisions have been made for applying the so-called quasi-legal solutions, with certain regulatory acts appearing as legal but running counter to the applicable laws in terms of substance.

The autumn 2003 parliamentary campaign in Russia saw a large number of gross breaches of the applicable law: opposition leaders being deregistered as candidates, government-run media being engaged to conduct aggressive propaganda drives to assure support of the pro-government political party and rejection of the opposition, massive frauds being registered in determining the election results.

The more visible quasi-legal moves have been the following measures: change of leadership at NTV – the larger privately-run television network in Russia; TV-6 Channel being terminated, the measure subsequently being recognised by the court as illegal; TVS Channel being silenced. Importantly, the moves aimed to take out the opposition media vehicles served to create an environment conducive to growing pressures against mass media outlets, particularly those operating in the provinces. As a result, Russia has actually lost all of her independent mass media activities, with nearly all federal media institutions pursuing pro-government policies while attacking the opposition. Clearly, a mix of the government-run media and centrally created political organisations thriving on the availability of administrative resources works to put in place a discriminatory environment for organisations that truly reflect the civil society’s sentiments, with the left wing (represented by CPRF party) and the right wing (Union of Right Forces and Yabloko parties) making no exception. Alarmingly, opposite statements and observations have been increasingly suppressed through the use of restored censorship activities and arbitrary rulings practised by judicial, coercive and administrative authorities. There have been some cases of unwelcome reporters and editors being arbitrarily punished or even killed. A stark example of political censorship is made by the complete print run of “FSB Explodes Russia” (brought into Russia legally) being apprehended in late December 2003. The book is dedicated to investigating the domestic special services being involved in arranging for the September 1999 Moscow and Volgodonsk apartment bombings that had been pinned on Chechen terrorists.

Another area of active application of quasi-legal procedures and measures has been election campaigns. The more controversial campaigns have been run in Sakha-Yakutia, Ingushetia and Chechnya. In these regions some candidates have been deregistered by court on the initiative of the opponents; legal actions have been initiated without any solid grounds to do so; arrests and searches have been conducted to exert pressures on the opposition to the pro-governmental contenders. Electoral frauds were reported as far back as March 2000. Then, many reputable political scientists and sociologists put in doubt Putin’s victory in the first round of presidential elections.

With Putin assuming supreme power, the so-called “spy trials” have been resumed. To remind, it was in the summer of 1999 that Putin (then head of FSB) classified a whole range of “spy trial” victims as traitors. As a consequence, the noted environmental scientist and journalist Pasko was sentenced to serve one year behind bars. Diplomat Moiseev was convicted on the obviously fraudulent charges. Following his three years in jail, Sutyagin (expert on arms control) has recently been sentenced to 15 years behind bars on the inconclusive FSB-origin charges.

Ethnic discrimination has been spreading most rapidly of late, the curse particularly hitting the Krasnodarsky Krai where local discriminatory acts and practices have led to thousands and thousands of ethnic minority members being devoid of civil rights, made subject to assorted persecutions with the authorities considering them illegal residents and calling for their forced deportation. All the protests notwithstanding, the federal authorities have been disregarding those lawless actions.

The greatest concern has been caused by the ongoing vicious attack against the civil society when arbitrary tactics and rulings are applied to deal with those who strongly come out against the central and local authorities or law enforcers. Making the increasingly frequent targets have been defence lawyers. Given the circumstance, we would like to highlight a number of episodes most illustrative of these lamentable trends.

4. Political persecution of civil society representatives

Among the processes now underway in the Russian society, of particular concern for human rights organisations in Russia is purposeful political persecution of civil society representatives. A new way of pressure upon civic organisations is the closing of such using various cover-ups. This approach was resorted to in Krasnodarsky Krai and Oryol, and in this way the representative office of the Danish Refugee Council was closed. The scale of political persecution (that is, persecution initiated illicitly or voluntarily by authorities and law enforcement agencies to establish illegitimate forms of keeping the society under command, suppress real or potential opposition, intimidate the civil society, etc.) has already reached a “Brezhnev level”, which allows the conclusion that the authorities have switched to the policy of selective victimisation. Human rights advocates consider politically motivated reprisals one of the most important components of the general strategy adhered to by official authorities. The essence of this approach consists in a purposeful demolition of democratic institutions in the Russian Federation.

The situation with political persecution aroused significant concern of the participants in the All-Russian Conference of Civic Organisations (Moscow, October 26-28, 2003) which has proved to be the largest independent forum (at least in a few last years) of human rights and other non-political organisations involved in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The resolutions adopted by the forum named the following persons as prisoners of conscience or persecuted for political reasons: lawyers – Sergei Brovchenko and Mikhail Trepashkin; human rights advocates – Rafael Usmanov (recognised as a “prisoner of conscience” by the Amnesty International) and Mikhail Konstantinidi; scientists – Igor Sutyagin and Valentin Danilov; “YUKOS case figurants” – Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Alexei Pichugin.

In November and December 2003, the All-Russia Public Movement for Human Rights prepared reports on the situation with human rights in Russia, with a special section dedicated to victims of political reprisals.

These reports were presented at the Vienna Conference of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Struggle against Torture, and the Maastricht Session of the OSCE Council of Ministers.

We have identified the following persons as victims of political persecution:
political prisoner lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin;
human rights advocate Rafael Usmanov (recognised a “prisoner of conscience” by the Amnesty International);
businessmen Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev;
YUKOS staff worker Alexei Pichugin;
scientist Igor Sutyagin.

Also, YUKOS defence lawyers – Olga Artyukhova, Anton Drel, Vyacheslav Patskov, Evgeny Baru and Yuri Schmidt – have been grouped with victims of political persecution. They were subjected to illicit searches and detentions, as well as other provocations. Using these provocative actions, the authorities attempted to deprive Olga Artyukhova of her lawyer status.

Interrogations, searches, fabrication of cases in respect of lawyers, more and more numerous occurrences of obvious fabrication of criminal cases with a political flavour, persecution of human rights advocates, politically motivated persecution of businessmen – these are evidence of revitalisation of the repressive machinery, now in relation to public figures of the Russian society. Among other things, the machinery employs fabrication of cases against relatives of human rights advocates, thereby turning them into a sort of hostages. For instance, an evidently fabricated case was initiated against sons of Viktoriya Alexeeva, a well-known rights advocate, who had been invoking for a few years to bring to responsibility corrupted judges and policemen in the Susumansky District of the Magadanskaya oblast, a gold mining centre. After petitions of human rights advocates to the court and prosecutor’ s office, including the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, the young men were released from custody on January 28, 2004, and the judge of the Magadan Regional Court, in his speech at the hearing, publicly complained that they failed to “lure” the mother of the young men to the Magadan region and the accused had to be released as a result of public protests.

Persecutions of human rights advocates and public activists take place in conditions of inefficient and biased procuracy supervision of the rule of law, ever growing dependence and engagement of the judicial system.

In summer 2003, the so-called “Yukos case” commenced, which is a series of criminal cases initiated against shareholders and employees of the largest Russian oil company implementing a number of charity projects in the domain of education.

Former staff members of power agencies have come to work in highest governmental authorities. A lot of high-rankers in the centre and in regions are directly linked with the army, Ministry of Home Affairs, Federal Security Service (FSB), and other power agencies. Having their current capabilities, these people eliminate their rivals, political opponents, unwanted individuals by means of illicit methods, they persecute businessmen and use heavy-hand approaches in settlement of economic disputes.

4.1. Reprisals against lawyers and human rights advocates

Violating their international commitments relating to guarantees for the safety of professional activity of lawyers involved in the defence of citizens within the frame of criminal proceedings, Russian Federation authorities have deployed persecution campaigns against lawyers with a principled position. Power agencies, first and foremost, the Federal Security Service (FSB), fabricate criminal cases against lawyers themselves. The new law on advocacy has contributed significantly to making lawyers dependent on law enforcement agencies and court.

4.1.1. “The Case of Lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin”

The case initiated against lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin is still in process. Lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin, an expert of the public committee for investigation of explosions of dwelling houses in the cities of Volgodonsk and Moscow (chair – Deputy Sergei Kovalev), was foisted a weapon and then imprisoned (without any court permission) in order to preclude Trepashkin’s participation in the court proceeding. Trepashkin, who has some evidence of implication of secret services in the explosions, was a very active opponent to conviction of innocent people and advocated the establishment of the truth. Earlier, he was charged with the disclosure of a state secret in connection with his interview to journalists relating to the events around the taking of hostages at the Theatre Centre on Dubrovka (the “Nord-Ost case”). The formal pretext for the accusation was as follows: lawyer Trepashkin, a former KGB officer, kept some USSR KGB documents at home with which he had worked many years ago. At the court session, the defence was able to prove the fact of illicit penetration into Trepashkin’s apartment by an unidentified person, and the further fabrication of records in the plumber call logbook.

“Torture-like conditions” of keeping under guard were used in full measure in respect of Trepashkin. After public protests of his defence lawyers, the conditions of imprisonment were improved. The European Court of Human Rights made the decision as to higher-priority consideration of the Trepashkin case.

The All-Russia Conference of Civic Organisations (late October 2003) approved the appeal to the Amnesty International to acknowledge lawyer Sergei Brovchenko as a prisoner of conscience and lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin as a political prisoner.

4.1.2. “The Case of Human Rights Advocate Rafael Usmanov”

Rafael Usmanov, a human rights advocate from Magadan, is still kept in a prison-like mental health facility in St. Petersburg. Rafael Usmanov is a human rights advocate with a 15-year track record. Since 1997, he has been repeatedly arrested for slander and contempt of court. He has been sent five times by Magadan judicial bodies for psychiatric examination.

In 2000, Rafael ran as a candidate for the Magadan region Governor. In the course of the election campaign he disclosed a lot of negative facts from the biography of V. Tsvetkov, then the current governor and a candidate for a new term (later, V. Tsvetkov was assassinated by a killer).

Unable to win the court proceeding, the authorities declared Usmanov insane and sent him to a specialised mental health facility (inpatient clinic) with intense care in St. Petersburg, where he was subjected to super-potent medication. From May 2003 to January 2004, no defence lawyers had been allowed to see Usmanov.

4.1.3 “The Case of Lawyer Sergei Brovchenko”

The case of Sergei Brovchenko, lawyer and human rights advocate, has been continued since spring 1997. On January 13, 2004, he was released after nearly 7 years of imprisonment. It was done because a day before the court changed the measure of restraint from imprisonment to recognisance not to leave. However, the proceeding is going on, the prosecution brought a protest against his release and the danger of judgement of conviction is still rather acute. For the time being, the fourth court session relating to the Brovchenko case is underway. The first three court decisions were cancelled after appealed against by Deputies of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
Sergei Vassilievich Brovchenko was kept in custody for 80 months, of which 41 in the so-called “ShIZO” (a punishment cell within a detention facility). In 1997, secret service staff foisted 4.5 g of cocaine to Brovchenko. In the package with foisted drug, a militia label used for sealing material evidence was found. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued three protests in relation to the Brovchenko case. The court decision was cancelled because of the absence of any evidence in support of guiltiness and because of numerous violations of law. Each time, the case was returned for a new judicial scrutiny to the district court, where the judgement of conviction was issued again. The authorities are putting considerable pressure upon the court in order to preclude the judgement of acquittal. The Brovchenko case contains a good deal of evidence that proves the corruptness and criminality of secret service agents. The Brovchenko case file contains some documents indicating that he was persecuted by FSB precisely because of his performance of professional duties associated with protection of citizens. There is some evidence of implication of secret services in illegal circulation of drugs. The example of criminal prosecution of Brovchenko is used by secret services to intimidate other lawyers. Yet, even in custody, lawyer Brovchenko continued his activities for protection of others. He has even established a network of human rights advocating organisations in institutions of confinement. The Moscow Directorate of the Ministry of Justice refuses to enter Brovchenko in the register of lawyers, even despite the demand of the lawyer community. Courts do not administer complaints against actions of the Ministry. In 2003, civil and human rights organisations requested the Amnesty International to assign the status of prisoner of conscience to Brovchenko. In January 2004, Sergei Brovchenko was released – the measure of restraint was changed, but the case was not terminated. In March 2004, he replaced Sergei Grigoryants as the head of the ‘Glasnost’ Foundation.

4.1.4. “The Case of Human Rights Advocate Mikhail Konstantinidi”

On January 15, 2004, Mikhail Konstantinidi, a human rights advocate from Novorossiisk, was released as convict on parole from a convict colony in the Ryazanskaya oblast. Mikhail Konstantinidi, the head of the Novorossiisk human rights organisation, was adjudged in 2000 by the Oktyabrsky District Court of the city of Novorossiisk (Krasnodarsky Krai) to 4 years in prison. The public interpreted the sentence as the revenge for his principled position in issues associated with environmental protection and human rights. Konstantinidi actively opposed to Krasnodarsky Krai authorities as the leader of the population movement against the construction of an offshore oil terminal at the site unfavourable from the viewpoint of securing the environmental safety of the project (results of independent ecological examination were not taken into consideration when the permit for construction was issued). The law enforcement bodies fabricated the evidence to prove the fraudulence on Konstantinidi’s part and he was convicted. Later, the court decision was cancelled by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation for procedural reasons. The new sentence was 3 years of general-regime imprisonment. In January 2004, he was released as convict on parole.

4.1.5. “The Case of Scientist Igor Sutyagin”

Igor Sutyagin, a staff scientist of the Institute of the USA and Canada and an expert in the domain of strategic weapons, has been kept in custody since October 1999. The Kaluga Region Directorate of the Federal Security Service (FSB) accuses him of a treason against the State, first, for the publication of articles in an official edition and then, when the first accusation failed, for Sutyagin’s transfer of his generalisation of publicly available data on problems of space and strategic weapons (the generalisation results were transferred within the framework of scientific collaboration with the Canadian Research Corporation “Future Alternatives”). Sutyagin was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

4.1.6. Cases of lawyers Anton Drel, Vyacheslav Patskov and Olga Artyukhova

Public prosecutors have repeatedly tried to interrogate lawyer Anton Drel, defence counsel of Yukos top managers Lebedev and Khodorkovsky, about the facts that became known to him in connection with the defence, while his office was unlawfully searched in his absence.

On October 30, 2003, lawyer Vyacheslav Patskov was summoned by an investigator for the interrogation of his client held in the FSB pre-trial detention centre. When he arrived, he was told that the investigator was going to interrogate the lawyer himself. Mr. Patskov refused to give evidence saying that the information that interested the investigation was received in the course of his performing his duties as a defence counsel. General Procurator’s office investigators threatened Patskov with initiating criminal proceedings against him and detention. Only after the interference by Patskov’s colleagues he was allowed to leave the General Procurator’s Office building. Lawyer Patskov had been unlawfully held in the investigator’s office from 9:00 to 16:00.

In November 2003, lawyer Olga Artyukhova, defence counsel of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was detained and unlawfully searched by Matrosskaya Tishina officers. In March 2004, defence counsels of Platon Lebedev, lawyers Evgeny Baru and Yuri Schmidt were searched.

Evidently, the persecution of lawyers Sergei Brovchenko, Mikhail Trepashkin, Olga Artyukhova, Anton Drel, Evgeny Baru, Yuri Schmidt and Vyacheslav Patskov is directly connected with their professional and human rights protection activity. Reprisals against and intimidation of lawyers endangers the efficiency of the advocacy as a civil society institution and integral part of independent justice. Independence of Russian justice is impossible without independent lawyers.

When performing his/her professional duties, a lawyer is not a subject of enforcement as he/she is an equal party to the process and application in respect of a lawyer of procedural enforcement measures is a violation of Russian legislation, rights of a defendant and the lawyer himself.

The All-Russian Conference of Civic Organisations held in late October 2003 adopted the appeal to Amnesty International with the request about recognising human rights advocate lawyer Sergei Brovchenko as a prisoner of conscience, and lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin, as a political prisoner.

Concern about the existing situation is also shared by the lawyers’ community, which is evidenced by the Resolution of the Conference of the Moscow Bar Chamber of November 22, 2003. The Resolution emphasises the persecution of lawyers by law enforcement agencies and encourages applications to international human rights organisations.

4.1.7. Human rights advocate Yuri Samodurov

In December 2003 criminal charges were brought against the well-known Russian human rights advocate, Director of Sakharov Museum and Human Rights Centre Yuri Samodurov and the Museum and Centre staff worker Lyudmila Vasilovskaya. They are accused under paragraph b) of Part 2 of Article 282 of the Criminal Code. Therefore, Samodurov and Vasilovskaya are facing an enormous fine by Russian standards, prohibition to practice and even up to five years’ imprisonment! The only thing they are “guilty” of is that they had permitted to hold in the Sakharov Museum the exhibition “Beware: Religion!” which included, among other exhibits, modern art works parodying some orthodox religious themes. However, several days after the opening, in January 2003, the exhibition was destroyed by pogromists – members of a rightist radical orthodox organisation. Two hoodlums detained red-handed were condoned by court in August 2003. In February 2003, State Duma deputies demanded that the General Procurator’s Office institute prosecution against the organisers of the exhibition. The legal proceedings were immediately instituted and now there is a real threat that Andrei Sakharov’s associate Yuri Samodurov, art critic Lyudmila Vasilovskaya and artist Alla Alchuk will be actually convicted for blasphemy.

In Russia’s modern history, there were no cases of bringing to justice for artistic criticism of desecration of religious symbols. Therefore, considering the triumph at elections of rightist radical nationalist organisations supported by the Kremlin, there is a real threat of demonstrative conviction of a well-known Russian public figure for religious reasons – with a view to stirring up nationalistic psychosis.

Samodurov, Vasilovskaya and Alchuk have actually become hostages in the struggle of Russian authorities against principled human rights activists. The Sakharov Museum and Public Centre have for 8 years been an actual human rights activities centre, where seminars and conferences on most acute public life problems and round table meetings of the most reputable Russian human rights activists – Initiative Group “Common Action” – are held on a regular basis.

5. Politically motivated and discriminatory criminal prosecutions

5.1. The authorities’ campaign against Yukos

Persecution by the authorities of one of the largest and, in experts’ opinion, the most financially transparent Russian oil company Yukos attracted attention because those events highlighted the picture of disregard for the rule of law and discriminatory administration of justice. On the face of it, the campaign began with the appearance in spring 2003 of the analytical report on the conspiracy of “oligarchs” with the main accusation being the establishment in Russia of a parliamentary republic. However, according to some sources, as early as late autumn 2002, at the meeting in the General Procurator’s Office of Russia, it was decided to persecute Yukos. Therefore, the baiting campaign against top managers of the oil company began even before the incident in the Kremlin in February 2003 when Mikhail Khodorkovsky publicly entered into debate with the President and accused the bureaucracy of total corruption. Since the end of June 2003, a number of arrests have been made and criminal prosecution instituted against Yukos top managers. This took place against the background of statements made by the heads of the General Procurator’s Office, which grossly violated the principle of presumption of innocence of Yukos managers and held them liable for Russia’s economic distress. The authorities forced to retire Yukos representative, president of the Russian State Humanitarian University Leonid Nevzlin who was then declared wanted. Then other major Yukos shareholders – Vladimir Dubov and Mikhail Brudno were also declared searched for. At the end of January 2004, there was detained Rafail Zainullin, Group II invalid, manager of the Yukos regional division in the Saratovskaya oblast. However, he was released by the court decision.

As the “YUKOS case” has been paid a good deal of attention in mass media, we will mention its episodes very briefly.

Alexei Pichugin, the head of the Yukos department of internal economic security, was arrested in late June 2003. The reason for the arrest was the criminal accusations of Pichugin by an imprisoned recidivist. Pichugin was interrogated unlawfully by officers of the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB), the more so, in a semi-unconscious condition and with the use of some psychotropic drugs.

Platon Lebedev, the chairman of the MENATEP company forming part of Yukos, was taken to prison directly from hospital in early July 2003. Lebedev was under investigation for tax evasion. The court left him under guard, which is a flagrant violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and in a drastic conflict with Putin’s statement that persons guilty of economic offences should not be subjected to pre-trial detention. While in prison, Lebedev accused publicly the heads of the General Procurator’s Office of the Russian Federation of having faked materials of his criminal case.

Vassily Shakhnovsky, president of the “YUKOS-Moscow”, was accused of tax dodging. He was the sole Yukos manager who was left at liberty after the investigation of his case was started. Despite the withdrawal of the claims against Shakhnovksy by the tax inspection (after he had paid the whole amount of the claims), the case was referred to court, quite contrary to the spirit and wording of the amendments made to the Russian Federation Criminal Code. Shakhnovsky was sentenced to one year of imprisonment, yet left at liberty – “in view of the changed public situation”.

Leonid Nevzlin, one of major Yukos managers, former president of the Russian Jewish Congress (in 2000 he replaced Vladimir Gusinsky in this position), was practically ousted from the office of the president of the Russian State Humanitarian University (RGGU) and turned into a political refugee. He was announced as a person in search immediately after his statement on his support of the campaign for nomination of Irina Khakamada (she had publicly charged Putin with an act of state terrorism during the assault of the Theatre Centre in Dubrovka (“Nord-Ost”)) as a candidate for RF presidency.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky was seized by an FSB task force team on October 25, 2003, when he was going to fly on his plane to take part in a conference dedicated to democratic reforms. That day may be deemed as the beginning of a new epoch, that of reprisals, in the history of post-communist Russia.

On January 15, 2004, the Moscow City Court dismissed the cassation appeal against the decision issued by the Basmanny District Court on December 23, 2003, regarding the extension of the period of imprisonment as the measure of restraint for Mikhail Khodorkovsky and on January 26 the Moscow City Court dismissed the complaint against the coercive detention of Khodorkovsky on October 25, 2003. This was done despite the explanation (provided on the same day) by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation that detention should be applied in exceptional cases only. On December 23, 2003, and March 18, 2004, the Basmanny Court extended the period of detention as the measure of restraint for Khodorkovsky. Those decisions were made in spite of violent protests on the part of the Russian and Western communities. In December 2003, numerous political analysts and sociologists arrived at the conclusion that the arrest of Khodorkovsky (and the struggle against Yukos as a whole) was one of the basic causes of a surge of anti-democratic and anti-western sentiments in Russia and a radical change in the balance of power in Russian elites.

It should be remembered that on October 25, 2003, an FSB task force team seized the plane with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of the Yukos oil company, when he came back from the conference of non-governmental organisations and businessmen in Nizhny Novgorod. The court authorised the arrest, which is a flagrant violation to the European Convention. In response to public protests, President Putin demanded to “stop the hysteria” and let see that, when arresting Khodorkovsky, the procuracy acted with Putin’s knowledge.

5.2. Persecution of the P.O.R.T.O.S Public Organisation

The cases of Yu. Davydov and E. Privalov, leaders of the P.O.R.T.O.S youth commune organisation (“Poeticised Association for Development of the Theory of Nation-wide Happiness) are under consideration by the Moscow Region Court. The process was resumed after it had been sent several times for “additional investigation”. Since December 7, 2000, four members of the organisation have been kept behind bars. In summer 2003, Belonenko and Merkulov were arrested and seven other members of the association were announced as persons in search. The founders of the commune “had been developing the theory of happiness and self-conversion from monkey into a genuine human being” on the basis of refusal from alcohol, drugs, tobacco, with the aim of spiritual and physical perfection. In mid-1990s, the commune had close contacts with Mikhail Gorbachev, it had turned into a sound enterprise involved in distribution and delivery of food products etc. (the greater part of profits was spent for charity, more specifically, material assistance to veterans and pensioners). On December 7, 2000, the task force of the Regional Department for Fighting against Organised Crime (RUBOP) broke into the territory of the commune and completely destroyed the flourishing enterprise. The arrestees were accused of very grave crimes, viz., “creation of an illegal armed entity” (members of the association had a few gas pistols and sporting guns, all registered officially), “organisation of an association infringing the rights and personality of citizens”. The arrestees were subjected to wild tortures. Two of the arrestees, accused Yu. Davydov and E. Privalov, were announced insane after an expert examination at the notorious Serbsky Institute. Despite the complete collapse of the case in court, two members of the P.O.R.T.O.S association (Irina Derguzova and Tatiana Lomakina) were sentenced by the Moscow Region Court to respectively 8 and 6 years of imprisonment. In experts’ opinion, the cause of the persecution might be Yuri Davydov’s dissident past (in the early 1970s the Ukrainian KGB sent him to a prison-type mental hospital) and the fear of certain circles because of the successful alternative economic model and non-conventional system of psychological and ideological influence on of the youth.

5.3. Case of Anatoly Makarenko

Anatoly Makarenko, former vice governor of the Smolenskaya oblast, is persecuted by Maslov, present governor, retired FSB general. In the case of Anatoly Makarenko, a lot of evidence corroborating the “coalescence” of local FSB and crime figures was brought into the open. In response to numerous Makarenko’s affirmations on offences committed by officials of the Smolensk Region FSB department, the procuracy issued decisions to dismiss initiation of criminal cases, while recognising the facts of illegal actions on the part of FSB staff. The bringing of several Smolensk Region FSB department staff members to disciplinary responsibility is not a measure of prosecution in response to evidence on perpetration of crime. Makarenko is still behind bars because of the charge with a number of economic crimes. Quite soundly, he considers his life is in danger. One of the basic causes for persecution of Makarenko was his intention to run for governor.

5.4. Case of businessman Dmitry Zazvonov

It may be called the “Yukos case” in miniature. The dispute between the authorities of the town of Elektrostal (Moscow region), on the one hand, and Zazvonov’s firm, on the other hand, with respect to the right of ownership to factory premises should have been settled down in arbitration courts. After having lost several claims against the businessman, the town authorities decided to use “strong-hand” methods to make the desired impact upon the tenacious businessman. The mayor of the town sent a letter to the head of the town department of home affairs in which he accused Zazvonov of dragging out the court proceeding and usurpation of power. By the “usurpation of power” the mayor meant the execution by Zazvonov of the decision of the Moscow Region Court made in favour of Zazvonov. The police initiated the criminal action against Zazvonov. The businessman himself had been fully unaware of the action until he was informed at a road police station that he was in search. While allegedly “in search”, Zazvonov made several trips abroad and the frontier, passport or customs control authorities had no information on his being in search. After human rights advocates’ intervention, Zazvonov was released, yet the investigation of his case is continued and the operation of his enterprise is seriously impaired. One of the basic reasons for the persecution was Zazvonov’s participation in the previous mayor elections and his intention to take part in the upcoming campaign (the present mayor is going to participate in the new elections, too). The case of Zazvonov evidences that authorities resort to “strong-hand”, unlawful methods of criminal prosecution to get rid of unwanted businessmen in disputes relating to property, or to eliminate or intimidate rivals in election campaigns.

6. Inefficiency of the judicial system, the procuracy supervision system and the law enforcement system.

Despite the overall growth in the number of law enforcement agencies’ personnel and a considerable increase in financing, the efficiency of police (“militia”) and secret service work is falling. The number of infringements of law committed by police officers is growing. The procuracy supervision system and courts cover up delinquent police officers and help them to avoid criminal responsibility.

In spite of an expressly stated position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, other courts, including the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, refuse to accept submissions of human rights organizations. Courts often either refuse to accept for consideration or grossly violate the rules of procedure in the consideration of the cases that touch the interests of the authorities including but not limited to legalization of the use of lie detectors during interrogations by the tax police; the use of phentanyl, which is a narcotic, and executions without trial during the liberation of the Nord-Ost hostages; the anticonstitutional nature of the referendum and presidential elections in Chechnya; the promotion by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation of an anti-Semitic and xenophobic textbook “The Fundamentals of the Orthodox Culture” by A. Borodin and S. Romanov.

The unlawful use of lie detectors during investigation is quite scandalous because Russian legislation does not envisage such method of investigative or operational activities as an interrogation with the use of a lie detector. Only once the defense tried to challenge the unlawful use of a lie detector when, in November 2003, the attorney of a former police officer Kachanov complained to the court about such interrogation. The Nagatinsky District Court of Moscow, however, dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the law did not expressly prohibit the use of lie detectors. Now, we would like to cite several typical examples of abuse of discretion.

6.1. Vasiliev’s Case

An under-age Vasiliev was a victim of a holdup, which resulted in severe injuries for him. The policemen on duty did not take any measures to save the injured persons; they did not even call the ambulance. Vasiliev was carried nearer to the scrap heap where he was left helpless. The ambulance was called by street cleaners only in the morning, 7 hours after the policemen on duty had been gone. In many respects as a result of the fact that Vasiliev did not receive medical assistance on time, he became an invalid of the first [the highest] category. He underwent 13 craniotomy operations. For two years this criminal case against the culpable police officers was under investigation, and was repeatedly discontinued and resumed. In September 2003, the court acquitted the policemen despite the evidence of their guilt. The judgment of acquittal deprives Vasiliev of an opportunity to demand compensation for the harm to health.

6.2 Klimkina’s Case

A precinct policeman shot dead Klimkina, a young woman, when she was walking her dog. The policeman was not suspended from work for the time of the investigation and was not deprived of his right to carry a gun. The outcome of the judicial proceedings was clear long before the sentence was passed. In December 2003, the policeman was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to three years conditionally.

6.3 Dikarev’s Case

Dikarev was detained by drug enforcement department officers. The policemen offered Dikarev to close his criminal case in exchange for money. Dikarev was released so that he could collect the necessary amount. Seeking protection from the unlawful actions of the policemen Dikarev turned for help to the so-called “internal security service” of the Moscow police. The policemen were detained when they were receiving the bribe and all the circumstances of the bribe-taking were documented. When several days later Dikarev was summoned to the precinct office he was surprised to see that it were the same officers, recently detained for bribe-taking, who were in charge of the case. It took us great efforts to have a criminal proceeding instituted against the policemen, but the procuracy unlawfully combined two cases into one proceeding. In this case there is very little chance that the policemen would be ever punished.

6.4. Wholesale Violations of the Rights of Inmates in Moscow Jails

On the eve of the elections to the State Duma several hundreds of inmates whose sentence had not yet been in full force and effect were transferred from pre-trial jails by an order of the Chief Department of Penitentiary System under the pretext of compliance with the standards of keeping inmates in Moscow detention centers. Many of them did not have time to study the case materials or file appeals with the cassation instance or be granted a meeting with their attorneys and relatives. Now the Moscow City Court is going to examine their cases without their participation, and in many cases without a formal insight of the defendants into the case materials. We are sure that in order to cover up the lawlessness the Moscow City Court will not reverse any of the sentences challenged by these persons. Thus, the main principles of justice have been violated: the presumption of innocence, the right for defence, the right for respect to privacy, numerous rules of the criminal procedure and the criminal executive legislation. In this way, with the consent of the authorities, with the direct involvement of the procuracy and connivance of the courts, this measure will result in knowingly unjust sentences in respect of hundreds of inmates whose guilt was ‘aggravated’ by the fact that they were in the pre-trial jails on the elections day. It became known that all this lawlessness took place with the direct consent of the procuracy. By this time, we have lodged a complaint against the unlawful actions of the procuracy and the penitentiary department officers. A criminal proceeding against the offenders was instituted. There was no reaction of the Central Election Commission to our submission concerning the violation of the inmates’ electoral rights.

These examples clearly prove the selectiveness of criminal prosecution in Russia and the inefficiency of the mechanisms of government and judicial control over compliance. The ‘priority of the law’ as the main slogan of the current Russian government, is of a declarative and selective nature and is meant to create a positive image of the Kremlin in the West.

The authorities themselves recognize that police does not enjoy people’s confidence, but they see the only way out of the situation in a one-million-dollar advertising campaign of commercials and posters.

7. Practice of Repressive Psychiatry

In the Soviet time, the regime’s adversaries were often subjected to political prosecution that made up an entire system, including forensic psychiatric expert examination in the Serbsky Institute. In the post-Soviet time this practice was discontinued, a law on psychiatric treatment was passed, but the system was not demolished entirely and in these latter days the practice of psychiatric punishment of ‘trouble-makers’ was resumed.

The use of psychiatry for repressive purposes in these latter days can be divided into three groups. First, it is the complete repetition of the scenario that was used in the Soviet time – punishment of the prominent human right activists who learned about certain crimes committed by the authorities and were ready to expose them. This is exemplified by the cases of Zotov, Usmanov and Romanov. The second group of cases is made up of psychiatric persecution of those persons who, while not being well-known public figures, seek justice by disturbing the authorities of one or another level. One of such examples is the case of Samchuk. Finally, with certain backdoor influence, psychiatric examination and compulsory treatment are used as a simple way to get rid of neighbors, relatives, etc. in so-called ‘domestic’ cases. An example of such case is the case of Veshnyakova.

7.1 Zotov’s Case

Sergei Borisovich Zotov, a businessman and human rights activist from Cheboksary, filed suits against abuses of certain top officials of Chuvashia. At one of the sessions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashia, Zotov protested against breaches of the rules of procedure, whereupon the chairman of the court called for bailiffs who arrested him for alleged hooliganism. A forensic psychiatric expert examination was carried out, which diagnosed him with schizo-affective psychosis, after which, at a closed session he was sentenced to compulsory treatment.

7.2 Usmanov’s Case (see Section 4.1.2)

Rafael Usmanov is a human rights activist from Magadan with 15 years of experience of fighting for human rights, former political prisoner recognized as prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. In 2000, he exposed the criminal activity of V. Tsvetkov, the governor of the Magadan Region of that time who was running for his second term. Tsvetkov was re-elected whereupon he accused Usmanov of slander. Judicial proceeding was initiated. Usmanov was called ‘for a conversation’ to a psychiatric neurological dispenser where he was seized and forcibly brought to a psychiatric hospital ‘for expert examination’. Usmanov was found insane and sent to a special psychiatric hospital in St. Petersburg where he was under intensive care. Usmanov is still in the hospital, which makes any meetings between him and his lawyers very difficult.

7.3. Romanov’s Case

Leonid Nikolayevich Romanov from the city of Yelets, Lipetsk Region, a lieutenant colonel in reserve, formed a human rights organization ‘Alyosha’ after his son died under strange circumstances. Through a human rights reception desk, he gathered voluminous materials concerning the abuses of the Yelets authorities and law enforcement bodies. After he had turned to the Lipetsk Region office of FSB (secret service) with a request to investigate those violations, a criminal case was initiated against him for ‘false denunciation’. He was subjected to a forensic psychiatric expert examination, and in order to carry it out he was seized and forcibly delivered to a psychiatric hospital where he was held for 9 days. He was released only after an appropriate court ruling.

7.4 Samchuk’s Case

Olga Fyodorovna Samchuk, a former functionary of the Oryol Region head’s administration, turned to the Sovetsky District Court of Oryol with a complaint against Ye. Stroyev who was at that time the Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. The court neglected the complaint for one-and-a-half months. On August 28, 1999, O.F. Samchuk came to Moscow in order to appeal to the federal authorities and the mass media concerning the infringements upon her rights, but she was seized by secret servicemen among whom she recognized Ye. Stroyev’s bodyguards. They brought her to the 4th Moscow Psychiatric Hospital named after Gannushkin where she was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. She was kept in the hospital for one month whereupon she was brought under guard to the Oryol psychiatric hospital. Later on, the court reversed the determination concerning her compulsory treatment, however even after that the Oryol procuracy tried once again to forcibly put her in a psychiatric hospital.

7.5 Vishnyakova’s Case

Tatyana Yurievna Vishnyakova from the city of Kirov was sent to a psychiatric hospital for forcible examination simply upon the denouncement of her former fiancé, a top police officer of the Kirov Region, with the ‘assistance’ of the local secret service. Afterwards the court reversed the ruling on her forcible examination, but there still is a possibility for using connections in the law enforcement bodies and psychiatric hospitals for personal revenge accompanied by all kinds of violations of the law. It is all the more possible that the authorities themselves set an example in the cases when they persecute ‘troublesome’ opponents.

8. Conclusions

The democratic institutions including one of the main achievements of Russia’s democracy, the free and independent elections of the representatives of legislative and executive power, are under the threat of complete liquidation. This will bring directly to the formation of an authoritarian system in Russia, which will deprive the ideological and political opponents of an opportunity to state their position. The falsification of the election results by the authorities has become much easier since the system of automatic polling ‘Vybory’ (Elections) was put under direct control of the Federal Security Service (secret service). At the same time, the public justice system is being demolished by becoming corrupt and manipulative, including in the events of conflicts between the interests of entrepreneurs and businesses that have close ties with the authorities. In general, the overall logic of the evolution of Russia’s justice is creating a system where practically any socially active person runs the risk of persecution.

The infringements on civil freedoms in Russia were exposed by representatives of Russian NGOs in 2003 at the OCSE Conferences and the UN Committee on Human Rights sessions. Russian human rights organizations submitted an alternative report to the UN Committee on Human Rights about the compliance by the Russian Federation with the provisions of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. The preparation of the report was coordinated by the Moscow Helsinki Group. The report was used as a basis for the Recommendations developed by the Committee in respect of Russia.

At the OCSE conference devoted to prevention of torture (Vienna, November 6-7, 2003) the information on the facts of torture in Russian pre-trial jails was handed over to the representative of the Dutch delegation to OCSE.

The Russian delegation spearheaded the initiative to send a special representative of the OCSE to Moscow to enable a direct monitoring of the lawfulness of the actions of law enforcement agencies and courts within the framework of the criminal cases associated with so-called ‘YUKOS case’ and criminal prosecution of attorneys and human rights activists. The human rights activists insisted on a new OCSE mission to Chechnya.

Lev Ponomarev,
Executive Director
All-Russia Public Movement
‘For Human Rights’