Last Tuesday the US-EU Summit was held in Washington : no one, or hardly anyone noticed it. On the other hand, everyone knows well in advance that in a few days' time Barack Obama will visit China. In the midst of this oversight and attention, international relations over the past few years is slipping the balance of power away from transatlantic relations towards a transpacific axis, meaning the G2.

Is this really the trend? Our thesis is that it is not exactly the case. Better still, our thesis is that Europeans still have some cards to play to qualify in the game – if they wanted to, and only if they wanted to envision a G3. Look at the figures. The transatlantic economic area still remains the widest, richest and most integrated globally. Looking at foreign direct investments, US-EU relations are more important for both than their relations with China. Notwithstanding statements on increasing Chinese power, Europe's weight in international trade continued to grow during the last decade. The EU is the principle global trade power, even if - for mysterious reasons - we pretend not to notice it. Apparently, discussion on international monetary equilibrium seems to depend exclusively on relations between China and the US, as the biggest Asian creditor and Western debtor. In reality, the EURO has its own weight, on the condition that the European Monetary Policy be seen not only as an internal policy within the EU but at long last as part of a global strategy. This would allow resisting pressures put on the euro today.

A monetary G3 would be a step forward for the European economy and for the reform of international economic governance. After all, we have already seen the effects of G2 : it would be difficult to refer differently to the "precarious relation" between the US propensity to spend and the Chinese tendency to save, which had been amongst the genuine causes of the financial crisis.

If an economic G3 could be imagined - given the data on the relevance of the euro zone and since the EU theoretically has common monetary and trade instruments to use - it would be difficult to understand whether the political alliance between Europe and the US is part of the past or whether it also has a future. Because if this were not the case, if the Atlantic side were not properly governed, Europe would remain a regional power only, maybe with a favored relation with Moscow (EU-Russia); and would not become an actor in the new global order.

According to the recently published report of the European Council on Foreign Relations, there is a specific risk : that Europeans continue telling themselves lots of "fairy tales" and lies in their relations with Washington. The fact is that Barack Obama is the first post-Atlantic president since half a century; the fact is that a divided Europe does not interest him; and that America is sufficiently pragmatic in judging Europe not by nostalgia (indispensible link during the Cold War) but on the basis of what Europeans could concretely offer in managing international crises as in Afghanistan and in the Middle East, etc.

For this reason, if Europe intends to preserve its relation with the US, it can no longer limit itself with its past traditions with the Atlantic; on the contrary Europe should liberate itself from them. The theory behind the ECFR report is that only a "post-American" Europe would be more interesting for Washington. Paradoxically, in fact, Europe could mature as an international actor, only by emancipating itself from a subordinate relation with the other side of the Atlantic, (in terms of strategic choices, definition of its own interests, common foreign policy instruments). Independence is a condition for its relevance. And is a condition to save the Western alliance that will be less unbalanced - and therefore more useful to the US - or an alliance that will no longer exist.

We agree. We agree on the general orientation of the report, but only partially. Because some of the assumptions of the ECFR Report are either debatable or are not demonstrated (for instance, what does living in a "post American" period mean?). Could it be taken for granted that Europe would no longer need, in terms of security, American protection? Judging the level of European military spending and especially their quality, we would say no. And what are the diverging interests between the US and Europe, often evoked in the ECFR Report but never defined? The real geopolitical fracture that could be verified - those between "EU-Russia" and "China-America" - are not taken into consideration.

As an invitation to reflect without too much taboo, the point of departure suggested by the ECFR Report is useful : in terms of relations with the US, Europeans continue suffering from an unbearable childishness. They seek protection, are used to delegating, and so eager to preserve bilateral relations often called "special". All these put together impedes the EU from assuming its own responsibilities. A G2 could be avoided if the EU adds its potential political power to its economic weight.

This piece was first published in Corriere della Sera on 5 November 2009.