The Internet is not an instrument of freedom, or of democracy. It is an instrument. It can be used to increase the possibilities of oppressing and controlling citizens, or to restore powers arbitrarily taken from them or recognised only on paper.



When power is dictatorial, the damage caused by technocracy is devastating: Orwell's 1984 was a memorable warning of this danger. But even when the State is formally democratic, the abuses of bureaucracy and of the repressive machinery represent a real threat. The digital territories once thought to be destined to become the new frontier of free individual initiative have already been subject to the hyper-regulation of the State. In Italy, for example, the obligatory membership of the Roll of Journalists for newspaper editors has been extended to Internet sites, while after twenty months of investigations many sites have recently been closed down because they contain blasphemous material: not paedophile pornography, not even dangerous terrorist information, but simply material that offends the Catholic religion.

Our intention in this conference is to consider the relations between three issues linked to digital technology: data retention, e-democracy and cyber-nonviolence:



- data retention: or how technology is used by the State to control citizens. The political problem is what limits to place on this type of control;

- e-democracy: or how technology is used to give more power to citizens, facilitating access to civil and political rights;

- cyber-nonviolence : or how technology is used for political initiatives, also for nonviolent opposition to violence or to the abuse of power;



The relations between the three issues are direct, because they concern choices of political priority. The State currently gives priority to instruments for the control of citizens, limiting the ordinary protection of privacy essentially to relations between private citizens, between companies, between individuals.

As those who followed the debate on the Directive on the subject of privacy in electronic communications (for which I was the rapporteur) will know, I myself opposed any legislation which I considered too restrictive on the so-called system of binding opt-in for unsolicited e-mails. I do not wish to re-open this debate, on which I know many of the speakers here disagree with my view. Far from wanting to legalise spamming, I was merely objecting that even in terms of the respect for the "demand" for privacy individual preferences can be more or less open, and that once the correctness of the message has been imposed by law (identifiable sender, clear declaration of the commercial nature of the message, etc.), individual preferences can be expressed more through technology than through the law.

What is paradoxical, however, is that it was precisely some of the most fervent advocates of opt-in who then gave way on the demand of the Council of Ministers to include the reference to the obligatory conservation of data by telephone operators and providers of Internet access, a reference which is as dangerous as it is vague.

In other words: No to unsolicited e-mails for private individuals, but yes to widespread data retention by the State! In my opinion, on the other hand, the processing of personal data by the State should be the subject of more - not less - attention from the legislator, for the simple reason that the State holds both the power of knowledge (being in possession of a vast quantity of personal data) and the monopoly of authority and of the use of force.



The European legislation does not lay down direct control by the European Parliament in this field, in that judicial and police co-operation is regulated by the intergovernmental method. But if the fundamental characteristic of a State based on democracy and the Rule of Law is that power should be subject to the law, it is clear that the challenge lies precisely in making the use of the new digital technologies subject to the law and to democratic control, promoting the reinforcement of the individual liberties.



It is not only a matter of "protecting" citizens, but also of providing them with new instruments of knowledge, communication and decision-making. There is another monopoly of the State, that of the organisation of the life of the institutions and of the implementation of the civil and political rights of citizens. The proposal of the Radical deputies, which we will consider in more detail later, is to include the right of access and implementation of European citizenship through the Internet in the Treaties of the European Union.



The "democratic priority" proposed by the Transnational Radical Party involves not only the promotion of e-democracy as the opposition to censorship and to the abuse of power, but also international policy and the definition of cyber-crime. We must not allow our governments to remain neutral in the face of the repression exercised in countries ruled by dictatorships. We must not allow legislation to be "technicised" to such an extent that actions can be deemed to be criminal irrespective of the conditions of those who perform them. The case of those who break into an information system in order to steal, destroy, or even to commit or facilitate violent actions, is very different from that of those who do so to resist violence, to block instruments of oppression, to stop censorship and to bring information where it is not allowed; this distinction is not reflected adequately by the national legislations, and even less so by the international Conventions - such as that against cyber-crime - or by the acts of the European Union. The EU proposal relative to attacks against information systems (of which I am the rapporteur for consultation to the Industry Commission) introduces the principle of extra-territoriality in the application of the law, although it does not lay down explicitly any distinction taking into account the different aims of an attack against an information system. This means that we risk imposing penalties on those who, operating from within the territory of the European Union, carry out acts of civil disobedience against information systems used by dictatorial regimes.



The alliance against terrorism is increasing this confusion by having a negative influence on political decisions. To return to the debate on the European Directive on privacy in electronic communications, many people appealed in support of the inclusion of data retention to the need to combat terrorism after 11 September. This argument was raised without taking the slightest account of the fact that almost all the analysts and experts believe that the inability to prevent terrorist attacks was not due to a lack of information, but to the inability to analyse the information itself. In other words the solution is not to extend the collection of data to the whole population but to focus the collection and analysis of the data itself. If we consider the root causes of terrorism and political instability, we should use our resources to build democracy and legality in those places where they do not exist, to organise true nonviolent counter-information "attacks" in support of dissidents, oppressed peoples, and freedom-fighters, both on-line and "off-line". And here the new technologies can play a fundamental role.



This, then, is the challenge for the legislator, and also for governments, called on to make decisions on public investments, security, defence, and intelligence strategies. What is needed is not only a reinforcement of the instruments of e-democracy, but also the conversion of military spending and structures into civil spending and structures able to prevent violence and armed conflicts, making use above all of the powerful weapon of information, as "open" and "shared" as possible.

This challenge undoubtedly also concerns private businesses, who are fundamental actors in the market of the new technologies and are directly involved in the definition of the priorities of public investment and legislative intervention, also in relation to the co-operation agreements with developing countries. It is one thing, in fact, if these businesses operate in the presence of high standards in terms of individual liberties, promoted for example by clauses that impose conditions on aid and investment; it is another thing, however, if their sole concern is to maintain relations with whoever happens to hold power at a particular moment, and exercises this power not only with no respect for the fundamental human rights, but also without creating the conditions for the market and for free competition. In such contexts it is generally monopolies based on relations of political patronage and on corruption that prosper.

This is why I believe that the battle in favour of democracy and freedom on-line is also a battle in favour of the market and of free enterprise.